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sophisticated	 versions.	 In	 their	 crude	 forms,	 the	 theories	 are	 strik-
ingly	similar,	whereas	in	their	sophisticated	forms	they	are	strikingly	
dissimilar.	




nately	 there	 is	no	uniform	usage	of	 the	terms	 ‘statement’	and	 ‘sentence’	 in	
ordinary	 discourse	 or	 in	 the	metaethical	 literature.	 A	 rough	way	 to	 distin-
guish	these	terms	that	I	think	good	enough	for	present	purposes	is	as	follows:	








making	 statements.	 The	 interaction	 between	 these	 is	 notoriously	 complex	
and	controversial.	Moreover,	much	of	what	can	be	said	about	statements	can	
also	be	said	about	their	mental	analogs.	However,	I	won’t	go	into	either	of	
these	 issues	 here.	 I’ll	 also	 leave	 it	 vague	 how	 far	 the	 class	 of	 ethical	 state-
ments/sentences	 extends.	 If	 everything	 I	 say	 about	 ethical	 statements/sen-
tences	were	true	only	of	statements/sentences	about	what	is	ethically	right	
or	wrong,	that	would	still	be	significant.
2.	 Original	 defenders	 include	 Ayer	 (1936)	 and	 Stevenson	 (1937).	 It’s	 worth	
noting	 that	ethical	expressivism	 is	 sometimes	 interpreted	as	a	claim	about	
the	meaning	of	ethical	words	and	the	sentences	 in	which	they	figure.	(See,	
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themselves	which	then	explain	the	attending	motivations.	More	gen-






Avowal expressivism (to	 coin	 a	 new	 name	 for	 an	 old	 view)	 is,	 at	
least	 originally,	 the	 view	 that	 ordinary	 first-personal	 present-tense	
ascriptions	 of	 mental	 states	—	avowals	 like	 “I	 want	 tea”	 or	 “I	 love	
you”	—	express	not	self-ascriptive	beliefs	but	the	very	mental	state	they	
avow	—	e. g.,	a	desire	for	tea	or	love	for	one’s	addressee.3	The	primary	
motivation	 for	 this	 view	 stems	 from	 certain	 asymmetries	 between	






































plies	 a	 realist	 view,	 according	 to	which	 our	 ethical	 statements	 com-
mit	us	to	the	existence	of	ethical	facts.	And,	on	such	an	account,	the	










course	 as	 legitimate	 although	not	 ontologically	 committing,	 and	he	








































5.	 Despite	 the	broad	way	 I	 think	we	should	understand	 introspectionism,	 it’s	
implausible	to	think	that	the	general	ability	to	express	our	minds	should	be	
thought	of	as	 the	 faculty	of	 introspection.	For	we	share	 this	general	ability	
with	other	organisms	to	which	it	is	implausible	to	attribute	self-beliefs.
a	mental	state	for	which	one	can	have	good	or	bad	reasons,	such	as	
a	belief.	 In	 cases	 like	 these,	where	one	says,	 for	example,	 “I	believe	
the	President	is	guilty	of	treason,”	we	can	of	course	challenge	the	be-
lief	avowed	by	saying	something	like	“That’s	not	right:	the	President	
hasn’t	 done	 what	 you	 think	 he	 has	 done.”	 What	 remains	 typically	
unchallengeable	 is	 the	avowal	 itself.	To	challenge	this,	we’d	have	to	





In	 light	 of	 this	 asymmetry,	 the	 two	 primary	 advantages	 usually	
claimed	for	avowal	expressivism	are	(i)	the	epistemologically	parsimo-
nious	way	in	which	it	can	explain	why,	in	ordinary	discourse,	avowals	
are	 typically	 unchallengeable,	 and	 (ii)	 the	 cognitively	 parsimonious	
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avowals	as	ostensible	manifestations	of	knowledge	in	a	way	that	tra-
ditional	 expressivists	 cannot	 satisfactorily	 explain.	When	 Suzy	 says,	
“Torture	is	wrong,”	if	we	think	the	claim	is	correct,	sincere,	and	one	to	
which	Suzy	is	entitled,	then	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	Suzy	knows	
that	 torture	 is	wrong.	 Likewise,	when	Suzy	 says,	 “I	want	 tea,”	 if	we	
think	that	the	claim	is	correct,	sincere,	and	one	to	which	Suzy	is	en-
titled,	then	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	Suzy	knows	that	she	wants	tea.	











from	 the	 fact	 that	 ordinary	 discourse	 treats	 ethical	 statements	 and	





























explanatory	 parsimony	 over	 the	 dominant	 rival	 theory.	 This	 is	 the	




the	 fact	 that	 that	 ordinary	 discourse	 treats	 ethical	 statements	 and	
6.	 That	doesn’t	mean	 that	 the	 avowal	 expressivist	 has	 to	deny	 that	 there	 is	 a	
faculty	or	method	of	 introspection.	It’s	 just	that	she	doesn’t	have	to	appeal	
to	this	faculty	or	method	in	providing	a	general	account	of	the	unchallenge-
ability	 and	 first-personal	 authority	 of	 avowals,	 which	means	 that	 she	 can	
say	 comparatively	 less	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 origin	 of	 introspection.	 Even	






ist’s	position	is	that	this	expresses	the belief that p,	and	not	the	second-order	
belief	 that	 the	 speaker	 believes	 that	p.	 The	 avowal	 expressivist	 holds	 that	
avowals	express	the	underlying	mental	state	itself	rather	than	second-order	
beliefs	about	it.	Second,	there	are	some	ethical	expressivists	who	think	that	












mitments	one	must	adopt	 in	order	 to	gain	 the	principal	advantages	
of	each	theory.	In	the	end,	I	tentatively	suggest	that	the	commitments	
needed	 to	 make	 a	 cross-pollinated	 version	 of	 avowal	 expressivism	
work	are	much	 less	 tenable	 than	the	commitments	needed	to	make	
a	cross-pollinated	version	of	ethical	expressivism	work,	though	both	
positions	involve	significant	theoretical	costs.
II. Avowal Expressivism And Epistemic Continuity
Originally,	avowal	expressivism	was	a	deflationary	view	of	self-knowl-
edge.	Avowals	are	declarative	 in	form,	yet	 they	typically	enjoy	a	dis-
tinctive	unchallengeability.	This	unchallengeability	 leads	us	 to	 think	
that	 avowals	 are	 the	manifestations	 of	 a	 special	 kind	of	 knowledge,	



















enough	 to	 inspire	 considerable	 theoretical	 sophistication	 in	 search	
of	plausible	defenses	of	modified	forms	of	each	kind	of	expressivism.	
Interestingly,	 these	 contemporary	 defenses	 have	 pursued	 markedly	
different	strategies	for	shoring	up	the	relevant	version	of	expressivism	





(e. g.,	 ‘truth’,	 ‘represents’,	 ‘fact’,	 ‘belief’,	 ‘knowledge’,	 etc.).	 And	 in	 the	









It’s	 interesting	 that	 contemporary	 avowal	 expressivists	 have	 not	
tried	to	use	the	quasi-realist	strategy	for	meeting	the	objection	from	
epistemic	 continuity	 as	 it	 confronts	 their	 view,	 and	 that	 contempo-
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facto,	 they	do	not	 represent	a	privileged	kind	of	knowledge	 that	we	












Although	 there	 is	 work	 to	 be	 done	 to	 spell	 out	 the	 precise	 na-
ture	of	self-knowledge	on	 this	view,	 I	want	 to	grant	 that	 this	 line	of	
thought	succeeds	in	letting	the	expressivist	resist	deflationism	about	
self-knowledge.	For	on	Bar-On’s	view,	avowals	now	express	(in	part)	
beliefs,	 which	 can	 be	 true	 and	warranted.	 Given	 how	 drastic	 defla-
tionism	 is,	 this	move	 away	 from	 deflationism	 surely	makes	 avowal	































objection	 from	 epistemic	 continuity	 unanswered	 for	 avowal	 expres-
sivism.	How	can	one	be	an	avowal	expressivist	but	recognize	the	pos-
sibility	that	avowals	can	be	manifestations	of	knowledge?	
The	 most	 sophisticated	 and	 worked-out	 attempt	 to	 answer	 this	










one	might	worry	 that,	on	 this	expressivist	view,	avowals	 “cannot	be	
taken	to	articulate	things	we	genuinely	know	about	ourselves,	and	ipso 
10.	Compare	 McGeer	 (1996),	 Bar-On	 (2004),	 and	 Wright	 (1998,	 pp.	 34–43),	
though	Wright	doesn’t	endorse	 the	expressivist	view	he	discusses.	One	ex-
ception	to	this	claim	is	perhaps	Jacobsen	(1996).









beliefs	 that	 subjects	have	about	 themselves	not	only	 in	
the	 sense	of	holding	 true	 (as	 expounded	above)	but	 in	
















To	 be	 sure,	 the	 puzzling	 thing	 about	 the	 beliefs	 ostensibly	 ex-






















yet	 if	 suitably	 prompted,	 I	 would	 affirm	 the	 relevant	
claims.	(p.	364)	







this	belief	 can	be	explained	 in	any	number	of	ways	 consistent	with	
rejecting	 introspectionism	 as	 long	 as	 they	 don’t	 appeal	 to	 a	 special	
	cognitive	source.




of	 as	mere	 holdings-true.	When	 I	 avow	 “I’m	 in	 pain,”	 it	 is	 not	 plau-
sible	to	claim	that	I	believe	I	am	in	pain	but	I	have	not	yet	considered	
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as	 an	 (expressive)	 act	 and	 an	 epistemic	 reason	 for	 the	 avowal	 un-
derstood	 as	 representative	 of	 the	 subject’s	 self-judgment”	 (p.	 390).	
The	 idea	here	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 the	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 expressed	















	subjects’	 self-ascribed	conditions,	 rather	 than	 from	


























can	be	used	 in	an	account	of	what	 justifies	 the	beliefs,	but	 it	 seems	



















Indeed,	 some	 of	 what	 Bar-On	writes	 encourages	 us	 to	 interpret	
her	as	proposing	a	new	introspectionist	explanation	of	the	security	of	
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But	 it’s	not	only	 talk	of	ethical	 truths	 that	have	 tempted	some	 to	
realism.	 We	 also	 commonly	 embed	 ethical	 sentences	 in	 belief-talk.	
We	say	things	such	as	“I	believe	that	torture	is	wrong”.	And	if	beliefs	
are	thought	to	be	attempts	to	represent	the	facts,	this	would	seem	to	





a	 statement	 is	 just	 to	 express	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 statement.	
And	this	is	precisely	what	underwrites	quasi-realists	in	extending	their	
minimalism	about	truth-talk	into	minimalism	about	belief-talk	as	well.	















express	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 seems	 to	 undermine	 the	 primary	 ad-
vantages	originally	claimed	for	avowal	expressivism.	In	§4	below,	I’ll	
consider	the	suggestion	mentioned	above	that	the	avowal	expressivist	










ethical	 statements	are	 claimed	 to	be	merely	 “expressive”,	 as	 early	ex-
pressivists	seem	to	have	thought,	then	it	is	mysterious	why	we	some-






The	most	 influential	 response	 to	 this	 objection	 was	 initially	 for-
mulated	 in	Blackburn	 (1984),	where	he	proposed	 the	 “enterprise	 of	
quasi-realism”,	which	is	“to	earn,	on	the	slender	basis	[of	expressivist	











at	 issue	between	 realists	 and	expressivists.	 It	 is	because	of	 this	 that	
Dreier	 writes,	 “Minimalism	 sucks	 the	 substance	 out	 of	 heavy-duty	
metaphysical	 concepts.	 If	 successful,	 it	 can	help	Expressivism	 recap-
ture	 the	 ordinary	 realist	 language	 of	 ethics.	 But	 in	 so	 doing	 it	 also	
threatens	to	make	irrealism	indistinguishable	from	realism”	(2004,	p.	
26).15	But	 if	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 the	quasi-realist	enterprise	has	 the	de-
fect	of	divorcing	the	expressivist’s	leading	idea,	that	ethical	statements	
express	a	mental	 state	 interestingly	different	 from	 the	mental	 states	
expressed	by	uncontroversially	descriptive	statements,	from	the	first	
























In	my	view,	 there	are	 two	problems	with	 this	 line	of	 thought,	at-
taching	 to	 each	of	 the	 advantages	 originally	 claimed	 for	 the	 ethical	
expressivist.	The	first	problem	 is	 that	 it	 threatens	 to	undermine	 the	
whole	realism/antirealism	debate	in	metaethics.	The	second	problem	













true	 propositions,	 and	 that,	 when	 they	 are	 true,	 they	 state	 facts,	 in	
which	the	author	of	the	statement	believes.	However,	then	we	should	
wonder:	what	makes	this	an	antirealist	position?
Some	have	 suggested	 that	we	posit	 two	different	 senses	 to	 each	






14.	 Timmons	 (1999,	 pp.	 152–154)	 suggests	 something	 like	 this	 strategy.	 Along	
related	lines,	Ridge	(forthcoming)	suggests	that	we	can	avoid	creeping	mini-
malism	by	distinguishing	between	 robust	 and	minimalist	 senses	of	 ‘belief’.	
	 matthew	chrisman Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge
philosophers’	imprint	 –		11		– vol.	9,	no.	3	(may	2009)




tight	 connection	between	 ethical	 judgments	 and	motivations	 to	 act.	
Because	ethical	judgments	just	are	a	sort	of	motivational	attitude,	ex-
pressivism	purports	to	give	us	an	explanation	of	the	practical	nature	














































core	 expressivist	 strategy	 for	 capturing	an	ontological	difference	be-
tween	ethical	and	descriptive	discourse.	That	strategy	turned	on	claim-
ing	an	expressive	 contrast	between	ethical	 statements	 and	ordinary	
statements,	in	order	to	gain	a	contrast	in	the	ontological	commitment	














IV. A Different Response to the Objection from Epistemic Continuity
We	 haven’t	 yet	 discussed	 how	 ethical	 expressivists	 respond	 to	 the	
objection	 from	epistemic	 continuity.	Early	 ethical	 expressivists	 such	
as	Ayer	 (1936)	 adopted	 expressivism	 in	 part	 precisely	 because	 they	
thought	 there	 was	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 genuinely	 ethical	 knowledge.	





statements.	 However,	 interestingly,	 these	 ethical	 expressivists	 have	



























and/or	avowals	because	of	 the	parsimony	 those	views	promise,	 the	
conclusion	here	should	be	disheartening.
In	what	follows,	I	want	to	consider	two	theoretical	possibilities	that	
the	discussion	so	 far	has	 left	open.	 I	 said	at	 the	outset	 that	both	ex-
pressivist	views	face	both	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity	and	
the	objection	from	semantic	continuity.	However,	the	structure	of	my	
critical	 argument	against	 recent	 sophisticated	attempts	 to	overcome	
these	objections	in	either	arena	has,	in	each	case,	focused	on	just	one	




















making	 this	 possibility	work	 involves	 a	 radical	 commitment	 on	 the	


































20.	Some	have	 argued	 that	 an	 extension	of	 expressivism	 to	 epistemic	notions	


















account	of	 attributions	of	 knowledge	of	 some	matter	of	 fact	 can	be	






on	a	particular	 sort	of	 judgment,	 rather	 than	an	act	of	 expressing	a	
	factual	belief.	






that	overcomes	 two	objections	 threatening	epistemic	contextualism.	 I	 take	
this	to	be	consistent	with	Gibbard’s	(2003)	suggestion	mentioned	in	the	text	
above.
	 matthew	chrisman Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge
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always	have	 sufficient	 reason	 to	plan	 to	 rely	on	 someone’s	 avowals.	











avowal	 expressivism	 and	 ethical	 expressivism	 that	 undermines	 this	
























avowal	 expressivist	 to	 achieve	 a	 similarly	 internal	 response	 to	 the	
analogous	application	of	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity?	The	
idea,	 following	Gibbard,	would	be	 to	 explain	why	avowals	 seem	 to	
be	manifestations	of	knowledge	by	 characterizing	 the	attribution	of	

























laden	 judgments	 can	 countenance	 a	 complex	 structure	 of	 practical	
reasons	 that	 support	 planning	 to	 rely	 on	 someone.	 Perhaps	 the	dis-
tinctive	security	of	avowals	 is	a	reflection	of	 the	 fact	 that	we	almost	
Kvanvig	(2003,	ch.	7),	Cuneo	(2008,	ch.	5–6),	and	Lynch	(forthcoming).	These	
arguments	are	addressed	in	Carter	and	Chrisman	(ms).
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as	manifestations	of	knowledge	though	they	don’t	necessarily	express	
mental	 states	 that	we	 can	 have	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	 or	 that	 can	
plausibly	be	said	to	stand	in	inferential	relations	to	one	another	and	to	
other	mental	states	and	actions.
Above	 I	 suggested	 that	deflationism	about	 self-knowledge	 is	 too	
drastic.	But	 I	also	argued	that,	 if	we	opt	 instead	for	Bar-On’s	neo-ex-
pressivism,	we	commit	ourselves	to	the	view	that	an	avowal	expresses	
a	belief	that	is	the	result	of	an	active	self-ascriptive	judgment,	whose	





of	 avowals	would	 commit	 the	 avowal	 expressivist	 to	 a	 radically	 im-
plausible	view	about	what	mental	states	can	be	properly	referred	to	
as	knowledge.
V. A Different Response to the Objection from Semantic Continuity
















different	 kinds	 of	mental	 states	 stand	 in	 articulable	 inferential	 rela-










































like	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 sentences,	 statements,	
and	the	mental	states	expressed	in	a	way	that	makes	this	sort	of	dis-
tinction	appear	unintelligible.	For	instance,	if	you	think	that	of	ethical	
statements	 and	 avowals	 on	 the	 speech-act	 theorists’	model	 of	 asser-
tions,	 you	may	be	one	of	 these	philosophers.	This	 is	because	you’re	
thinking	of	statements	as	speech-acts	that	require	for	sincerity	a	belief	
in	 the	propositional	content	of	 the	sentence	stated.	Given	that	mod-



































not	 about	 their	 products”	 (p.	 252).	The	 idea	 is	 that,	 despite	 the	 fact	
that	avowals	considered	as	products	are	like	ordinary	declarative	sen-














































with	 the	same	content	as	 the	sentence	used	 to	perform	 the	speech-act,	 I’ll	
give	up	the	word	‘assertion’	in	exchange	for	my	stipulative	definition	of	‘state-











to	say	 in	 this	case	 is	 that	 the	statement	both	expresses	an	 intention	








































I	don’t	 think,	however,	 this	means	 that	Bar-On’s	 response	 to	 the	
objection	 from	semantic	continuity	 is	 completely	unavailable	 to	 the	
ethical	expressivist.	Rather,	what	it	means	is	that	he	cannot	use	it	to	











response	 to	 the	objection	 from	semantic	 continuity	discussed	 in	§3.	
However,	quasi-realists	go	on	to	extend	minimalism	about	truth	into	
a	minimalist	account	of	belief,	based	on	the	putatively	platitudinous	







Horwich’s	 (1994)	 brief	 remarks	 about	 the	 consistency	 of	 expressivism	and	
minimalism	about	truth.	However,	unlike	Stoljar,	Horwich	indicates	sympa-
thy	 for	 a	 correlated	minimalism	 about	 belief.	 This	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
slide	that,	as	I	argued	in	§3,	results	in	a	dilemma	for	the	ethical	expressivist	
between	quietism	and	realism.
threatening	avowal	expressivism.	Again,	 I	grant	 this	so	 that	we	may	
ask:	Could	an	ethical	expressivist	give	a	similar	response,	in	order	to	
answer	the	analogous	application	of	the	objection	from	semantic	con-
tinuity	 in	a	way	 that	doesn’t	 run	 into	 the	problems	 raised	 for	quasi-
realism	in	§3?
To	extend	Bar-On’s	strategy,	we	have	to	distinguish	between	ethi-






















26.	 In	 Bar-On	 and	 Chrisman	 (2009)	 we	 argue	 that	 applying	 the	 act-product	






















These	 commitments	 are	 significant	 theoretical	 costs,	 perhaps	 so	
significant	that	no	one	will	be	willing	to	pay	them	in	order	to	get	the	
advantages	 of	 ontological	 and	 psychological	 parsimony	 that	 expres-








































there	are	 two	potentially	problematic	 commitments	of	 the	 resulting	
position.	
First,	even	if	the	act-product	distinction	can	help	to	explain,	within	
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we	should	wonder:	Does	ethical	expressivism	have	 to	be	a	semantic	




tion	unanswered	 that	 ethical	 expressivists	 have	often	wanted	 to	 an-









The	 expressivist’s	 explanation	 of	 the	 apparently	 tight	 link	 between	





sivism	 that	 emerges	 from	co-opting	Bar-On’s	 avowal	 expressivist	 re-
sponse	to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	cannot	give	any	ac-
count	of	the	semantics	of	ethical	sentences	whatsoever.	After	all,	if	it	





tent	of	ethical	sentences	requires	appeal	either	 to	 the	 facts	 they	rep-
resent	 or	 to	 the	mental	 states	 their	 typical	 utterance	 conventionally	
expresses.	And,	since	the	expressivist	wants	to	avoid	commitment	to	













to	 positing	 some	 error	 to	 ordinary	 ethical	 discourse	 insofar	 as	 that	
involves	 the	ascription	of	ostensibly	ethical	beliefs.	And	 this	will	 in	








ethical	sentences,	 I	 think	 that,	 in	 light	of	 the	act-product	distinction,	
motivational	 states	 instead	 of	 beliefs	without	 undermining	 the	 obvious	 in-
ferential	relations	that	can	stand	between	ethical	judgments	and	other	sorts	
of	 judgments.	This	 is	a	nice	argument,	but	 I	don’t	 think	 it	 shows	 that	ethi-
cal	claims	must	express	beliefs;	rather	what	it	shows	is	that	whatever	ethical	
claims	express	must	be	capable	of	standing	in	rational	relations	with	beliefs.	
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Personally,	 I	 think	something	like	the	first	option	is	most	promis-













typical	 acts	 of	making	 an	 ethical	 statement	 express	motivational	 at-
titudes	rather	than	beliefs.	If	that	core	thesis	is	all	we	want	to	defend,	
there	 is	no	reason	the	ethical	expressivist	has	 to	commit	 to	any	par-
ticular	 semantics	of	 ethical	 sentences.35	 It	may	 seem	 that	going	 this	
34.	 I’ve	defended	this	 in	Chrisman	(2008b).	The	point	here	 is	not	what	 the	ex-
pressivist	should	say	about	the	semantics	of	ethical	sentences	but	that	there	
are	still	several	options	available	even	after	he	follows	Bar-On	in	making	the	






























perhaps	we	might	hold	that	 there	 is	nothing	 illuminating	to	be	said	
about	 the	 semantics	 of	 ethical	 sentences	 beyond	 regimenting	 com-
monalities	 and	 relations	 in	 content	 among	 subsentential	 parts	 and	
across	 languages:	 an	 ethical	 sentence	 expresses	 a	 particular	 propo-
sition,	which	 is	understood	not	 in	 representationalist	 terms	but	sim-










32.	 This	 is	 one	way	 to	 interpret	 the	 ontological	 commitments	 involved	 in	 the	
semantic	project	pursued	by	Davidson	(1967,	1975),	as	well	as	that	pursued	
by	Schiffer	(2003).	
33.	 This	 is	 akin	 to	 the	version	of	hermeneutic	moral	fictionalism	defended	by	
Kalderon	(2005).	This	has	seemed	to	some	to	be	a	unstable	view.	Perhaps	it	
is;	my	point	is	not	to	endorse	it	here	but	only	to	point	out	that,	without	further	














































ethical	discourse.	Moreover,	 the	core	 thesis	 is	also	central	 to	 the	ex-
pressivist’s	claim	to	a	psychologically	parsimonious	way	of	explaining	
the	connection	between	ethical	claims	and	motivations.
So,	 a	 cross-pollinated	 version	 of	 ethical	 expressivism	 is	 commit-
ted	to	denying	that	ethical	sentences	mean	what	they	do	in	virtue	of	







In	 §3,	 I	 argued	 that,	 if	we	 follow	 the	quasi-realist	 in	 taking	up	 a	
minimalist	stance	towards	talk	of	truth,	belief,	and	all	related	notions,	
ethical	expressivism	seems	to	be	undermined	by	a	dilemma	between	
























The	 first	 half	 of	 this	 paper	 argued	 for	 two	 negative	 conclusions	





will	 see	 the	cross-pollination	explored	here	as,	 in	 the	end,	perverse	
inbreeding	rather	than	good	engineering.	However,	I	also	suspect	that	
many	harbor	admiration	for	the	explanatory	parsimony	achieved	by	










Ridge,	 Eduardo	 Zamuner,	 anonymous	 referees,	 and	 the	 participants	 in	
the	May	2005	Symposium	on	 the	work	of	Dorit	Bar-On	at	 the	Universität	
Tübingen	(especially	Manfred	Frank	and	Frank	Hofmann).
because	 I	 think	 there	have	not	been	enough	 comparisons	of	 the	 re-
spective	 theoretical	 benefits	 and	 burdens	 of	 the	 two	 positions.	 But,	













for	 an	 explanation	 of	 our	 attributions	 of	 knowledge	 that	makes	 no	
















the	act	of	making	a	 statement	and	 the	product	of	 this	act,	which	al-
lows	for	an	explanation	of	semantic	continuity	at	the	level	of	linguistic	
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